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Documents authored by Krüger, Kristin

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LITES.7.1.1
Randomization as Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Real-Time Systems with Task Replication

Authors: Kristin Krüger, Nils Vreman, Richard Pates, Martina Maggio, Marcus Völp, and Gerhard Fohler

Published in: LITES, Volume 7, Issue 1 (2021): Special Issue on Embedded System Security. Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems, Volume 7, Issue 1

Abstract
Time-triggered real-time systems achieve deterministic behavior using schedules that are constructed offline, based on scheduling constraints. Their deterministic behavior makes time-triggered systems suitable for usage in safety-critical environments, like avionics. However, this determinism also allows attackers to fine-tune attacks that can be carried out after studying the behavior of the system through side channels, targeting safety-critical victim tasks. Replication -- i.e., the execution of task variants across different cores -- is inherently able to tolerate both accidental and malicious faults (i.e. attacks) as long as these faults are independent of one another. Yet, targeted attacks on the timing behavior of tasks which utilize information gained about the system behavior violate the fault independence assumption fault tolerance is based on. This violation may give attackers the opportunity to compromise all replicas simultaneously, in particular if they can mount the attack from already compromised components. In this paper, we analyze vulnerabilities of time-triggered systems, focusing on safety-certified multicore real-time systems. We introduce two runtime mitigation strategies to withstand directed timing inference based attacks: (i) schedule randomization at slot level, and (ii) randomization within a set of offline constructed schedules. We evaluate these mitigation strategies with synthetic experiments and a real case study to show their effectiveness and practicality.
Cite as

Kristin Krüger, Nils Vreman, Richard Pates, Martina Maggio, Marcus Völp, and Gerhard Fohler. Randomization as Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Real-Time Systems with Task Replication. In LITES, Volume 7, Issue 1 (2021): Special Issue on Embedded System Security. Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp. 01:1-01:29, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@Article{kruger_et_al:LITES.7.1.1,
  author =	{Kr\"{u}ger, Kristin and Vreman, Nils and Pates, Richard and Maggio, Martina and V\"{o}lp, Marcus and Fohler, Gerhard},
  title =	{{Randomization as Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Real-Time Systems with Task Replication}},
  journal =	{Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems},
  pages =	{01:1--01:29},
  ISSN =	{2199-2002},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{7},
  number =	{1},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LITES.7.1.1},
  doi =		{10.4230/LITES.7.1.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: real-time systems, time-triggered systems, security}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2018.22
Vulnerability Analysis and Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Systems

Authors: Kristin Krüger, Marcus Völp, and Gerhard Fohler

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 106, 30th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2018)

Abstract
Much effort has been put into improving the predictability of real-time systems, especially in safety-critical environments, which provides designers with a rich set of methods and tools to attest safety in situations with no or a limited number of accidental faults. However, with increasing connectivity of real-time systems and a wide availability of increasingly sophisticated exploits, security and, in particular, the consequences of predictability on security become concerns of equal importance. Time-triggered scheduling with offline constructed tables provides determinism and simplifies timing inference, however, at the same time, time-triggered scheduling creates vulnerabilities by allowing attackers to target their attacks to specific, deterministically scheduled and possibly safety-critical tasks. In this paper, we analyze the severity of these vulnerabilities by assuming successful compromise of a subset of the tasks running in a real-time system and by investigating the attack potential that attackers gain from them. Moreover, we discuss two ways to mitigate direct attacks: slot-level online randomization of schedules, and offline schedule-diversification. We evaluate these mitigation strategies with a real-world case study to show their practicability for mitigating not only accidentally malicious behavior, but also malicious behavior triggered by attackers on purpose.
Cite as

Kristin Krüger, Marcus Völp, and Gerhard Fohler. Vulnerability Analysis and Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Systems. In 30th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 106, pp. 22:1-22:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{kruger_et_al:LIPIcs.ECRTS.2018.22,
  author =	{Kr\"{u}ger, Kristin and V\"{o}lp, Marcus and Fohler, Gerhard},
  title =	{{Vulnerability Analysis and Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Systems}},
  booktitle =	{30th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2018)},
  pages =	{22:1--22:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-075-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{106},
  editor =	{Altmeyer, Sebastian},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2018.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-89811},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2018.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: real-time systems, time-triggered systems, security, vulnerability}
}
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